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We study experimentally the relationship between intra-firm wage dispersion chosen by principals and workers'' 
performance. Principals show a preference for more egalitarian wage schemes, and workers are negatively influenced 
by high levels of wage inequality.
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     1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that workers￿e⁄orts are positively in￿ uenced by their own
wages (Fehr and G￿chter, 2000). Less is known, however, with respect to the im-
pact of intra-￿rm wage dispersion on workers￿e⁄orts and thus, the performance
of the ￿rm. Some theories ￿ such as tournament models in the line of Lazear
and Rosen (1981)￿ claim that intra-￿rm wage inequality has a positive e⁄ect on
workers￿e⁄orts. They suggest that a large dispersion in performance-based wages,
rewarding the most productive workers, stimulates workers￿e⁄orts since it increases
the marginal incentives. Other theories suggest that within-￿rm wage compression
enhances e⁄ort, though, due to the importance of fairness and cooperation among
coworkers (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990). The importance of fairness in labour
markets has been con￿rmed in a series of experimental gift-exchange games, ini-
tiated by Fehr et al. (1993). Contrary to standard game theoretical predictions
under the assumption of rational payo⁄-maximizers, they found a positive relation
between wages and e⁄ort, and wages above the market clearing level. Since the
experimental setting of Fehr et al. (1993) and follow-up papers match one principal
with one worker it is impossible to study the e⁄ects of intra-￿rm wage dispersion
in such a design, however. It is equally problematic to measure the e⁄ects of wage
dispersion on work e⁄ort outside the lab, because (i) it is often di¢ cult to measure
workers￿e⁄orts in the ￿eld, (ii) it is hard to determine a worker￿ s reference group,
and (iii) coworkers￿wages are often not observable (perfectly) in the ￿eld. These
limitations of ￿eld studies can be overcome in the lab. Charness and Kuhn (2007)
designed an experiment where they were mainly interested in how coworkers￿wages
a⁄ect a worker￿ s e⁄ort choice. They matched one principal with two di⁄erently pro-
ductive workers. The principal could pay di⁄erent wages to the two workers, and
workers had to choose an e⁄ort. Charness and Kuhn (2007) found that the own
wage, but not the co-worker￿ s wage, determined a worker￿ s e⁄ort level. Since work-
ers were not informed about their coworker￿ s productivity, though, it is possible that
the null-e⁄ect of coworkers￿wages was due to uncontrolled expectations about the
coworker￿ s productivity. For instance, if a worker expected the coworker to be more
productive, and observed a higher wage of the coworker, this might be perceived
as fair and there might be no need to condition one￿ s own e⁄ort on the coworker￿ s
wage. Yet, if a worker perceived the coworker￿ s wage as too high in relation to his
expected (but unknown) productivity, then a worker might be inclined to reduce his
e⁄ort contingent on his coworker￿ s wage.
In this paper, we are going to resolve the possible confound through uncontrolled
expectations and report the results of an experiment where productivity is known.
By matching one principal with four workers we also extend the analysis of the e⁄ects
of wage dispersion on e⁄ort levels to a larger setting where a worker can compare
himself to more than one other coworker (as is typically the case in reality). We let
a principal choose among various wage schemes that di⁄er with respect to intra-￿rm
1wage dispersion. By this approach we can examine principals￿preferences for the
wage dispersion among their workers and the relationship between intra-￿rm wage
dispersion and workers￿e⁄orts.1
We ￿nd that in 44% of the cases principals choose the most egalitarian wage
scheme, in 30% of the cases the intermediate scheme, and in 26% of the cases the
scheme with the highest wage dispersion. Workers￿e⁄orts depend positively on their
own wage, but they are negatively a⁄ected by high levels of wage dispersion.
In the following section we present the experimental design and procedures, in
section 3 the results, and in section 4 we conclude.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In the experiment subjects played for 20 periods in groups of 5 members each,
where each group included one principal and four workers. The roles of principal
and workers were determined through a general knowledge quiz at the beginning of
the experiment. Each session was run with 20 subjects. The four subjects with the
highest number of correct answers were assigned the role of principal. The remaining
16 subjects were divided into quartiles, according to the number of correct answers,
and the best quartile was assigned the role of worker 1, and the second, third, and
fourth quartile the role of worker 2, worker 3, and worker 4, respectively.2 All
subjects kept their roles throughout the experiment. The groups of 5 members each
were randomly rematched after each period, subject to including one principal and
four workers in the roles of workers 1 to 4. The workers had di⁄erent productivities,
and all this was common knowledge.
Each period had two stages. In the ￿rst stage the principal had to choose a wage
structure among the three di⁄erent schemes shown in Table 1. In the second stage,
the 4 workers were informed about the selected wage scheme, and thus about their
wage, since the wage scheme determined each worker￿ s wage. Then workers had to
choose an e⁄ort level, with e⁄ort costs shown in Table 2.
Wage Productivity Wage Productivity Wage Productivity
Worker 1 60 0.40 Worker 1 75 0.40 Worker 1 90 0.40
Worker 2 45 0.30 Worker 2 45 0.30 Worker 2 45 0.30
Worker 3 30 0.20 Worker 3 22.5 0.20 Worker 3 12 0.20
Worker 4 15 0.10 Worker 4 7.5 0.10 Worker 4 3 0.10
Total 150 1 Total 150 1 Total 150 1
SCHEME 1 SCHEME 2 SCHEME 3
Table 1: Wage schemes
1A paper by Clark et al. (2006) is somewhat related to our research question. They analyzed the
e⁄ects of income comparison on e⁄ort where the reference group consisted of equally productive
workers in di⁄erent ￿rms. They found that income comparison matters, especially downwards.
While they were interested in inter-￿rm comparison our focus is on intra-￿rm comparions with
di⁄erently productive workers.
2In case of ties, the computer ranked the subjects with the same number of correct answers
randomly.
2Effort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Cost 0 2 4 8 12 16 20 24 30 36
Table 2: E⁄ort levels and costs
Table 1 shows also the workers￿productivities, which did not depend on the wage
scheme. Worker 1 had always the highest productivity, and received the highest
wage in each wage scheme. Worker 4 was the one with the lowest productivity, and
got the lowest wage in any scheme. Whereas the ratio of most productive to least
productive worker was ￿xed at 4:1, the three schemes imply ratios of the highest to
the lowest wage of 4:1, 10:1, and 30:1.
The single workers￿productivities yielded the average e⁄ort in the ￿rm as follows:
Average effort = Effort1￿0:4+Effort2￿0:3+Effort3￿0:2+Effort4￿0:1 (1)
where E￿orti is the e⁄ort level chosen by worker i. The average e⁄ort determined
the ￿rm￿ s total product, and consequently the earnings of the principal and the
workers, as follows:
Total product = Average effort ￿ 300 (2)
Earning Principal = 20 + 3=4 ￿ Total Product (3)
Earnings Worker i = Wagei ￿ Cost(efforti) + 1=16 ￿ Total Product (4)
where i = f1;2;3;4g. Wagei is the wage of worker i, and Cost(effort)i is the
cost of his chosen e⁄ort level.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Innsbruck with the help of z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Recruitment was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We
conducted six experimental sessions, in which 120 subjects participated. Earnings
were accumulated over the 20 periods, and each point was converted at the end of
the experiment into 0.02 e. Sessions lasted less than 90 minutes, and on average
subjects earned 18.30 euros.
3 Results
Table 3 shows how frequently the three wage schemes were chosen by the principals.
A chi-square test reveals that the di⁄erent schemes were not chosen randomly (p-
value < 0.01). The most egalitarian scheme 1 was chosen most often, and scheme 3
with the largest wage dispersion least often.3
3This result is in line with G￿th et al. (2001) and Charness and Kuhn (2007). They found that
principals consider horizontal fairness and therefore reduce wage di⁄erences when the co-worker￿ s
wage is known.





Table 3: Frequency of choosing di⁄erent wage schemes
Table 4 shows the average e⁄ort (de￿ned in section 2) contingent on the prevalent
wage scheme. The ￿rst conclusion that can be drawn from table 4 is that average
e⁄orts are higher than the minimum of 0.1. The second conclusion is that the
di⁄erent wage schemes do not lead to signi￿cantly di⁄erent e⁄orts in the aggregate.




Table 4: Average e⁄ort and wage schemes
Table 5 reports average e⁄orts by the di⁄erent types of workers. Obviously,
there is a positive relation between the wage and the chosen e⁄ort, as the workers
with higher wages chose higher e⁄orts (with a single exception for worker 3 in wage
scheme 1, which is driven by an outlier). Accordingly, the dispersion in e⁄orts is
increasing in the dispersion in wages.
Type of player Wage scheme 1 Wage scheme 2 Wage scheme 3
Worker 1 0.26 0.27 0.33
Worker 2 0.22 0.23 0.21
Worker 3 0.27 0.22 0.20
Worker 4 0.18 0.15 0.13
Table 5: Average e⁄ort by wage scheme and type of player
The overall percentage of subjects that chose the minimal e⁄ort is 48%, 52% and
57% in schemes 1, 2, and 3, respectively, with the di⁄erence between schemes 1 and
3 being statistically di⁄erent (p = 0.001; Mann-Whitney U-test.) The large fraction
of workers choosing the minimal e⁄ort is mainly due to workers 3 and 4. Workers
3 chose the minimal e⁄ort in 39%, 48%, and 60% of cases (with p < 0.08 in each
pairwise comparison; Mann-Whitney U-tests), and workers 4 in 56%, 69%, and 82%
of cases (with p < 0.02 in each pairwise comparison; Mann-Whitney U-tests).
So far we have examined the e⁄ects of di⁄erent wage schemes on workers￿e⁄orts
without controlling for the wages received by the workers. To determine the e⁄ects
of the wage dispersion more rigorously we show in Table 6 the results of a panel
tobit estimation with the e⁄ort level as the dependent variable. The independent
variables are dummies for the wage schemes (with scheme 1 as the benchmark), the
own wage, two interactions terms between the wage scheme and the own wage, the
age, the gender (takes value 1 if the subject is a female), a dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the subject studies Economics or Social Sciences, and the period.
4Random-effects Tobit Coefficient p-value
(I) (II) (III)
Wage scheme 2 -0.0062 -0.0186 -0.0140
0.43 0.30 0.44
Wage scheme 3 -0.0119 -0.0416 -0.0351
0.15 0.03 0.07
Own wage 0.0021 0.0012 0.0016
0.00 0.06 0.02
Wage scheme 2 * Own wage 0.0003 0.0002
0.44 0.63








Period -0.0071 -0.0071 -0.0071
0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.2237 0.2552 0.2298
0.00 0.00 0.01
Number of observations 1920 1920 1920
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6: Tobit estimation of the e⁄ort level chosen by the workers
As expected, the own wage has a strong and signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on e⁄orts.
But in addition to that we ￿nd a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect of the most extreme
wage scheme 3, if compared to the most egalitarian scheme 1. Working in a group
with an extreme dispersion of wages seems to undermine work morale. There is no
such e⁄ect when we check the in￿ uence of the intermediate wage scheme 2. Although
it has also a negative sign, it is not signi￿cant, suggesting that wage dispersion has
a non-linear in￿ uence on e⁄ort levels. Low and intermediate dispersion have no
downside e⁄ect on a worker￿ s e⁄ort, hence the coworkers￿wages are not important
for own e⁄ort choices (which is then a ￿nding similar to the one of Charness and
Kuhn, 2007). The variable Period is signi￿cant and has a negative sign, i.e. e⁄ort
levels decrease across periods, which is a standard ￿nding (see Fehr and G￿chter,
2000). The interacted variables are not signi￿cant, meaning that the combination of
wage dispersion and own wage does not a⁄ect a worker￿ s e⁄ort in systematic ways.
In sum, the results in Table 6 suggest that subjects care about wage dispersion
when it becomes very large. This is also an indication that subjects have social
preferences, i.e. they do not only care about their own wage, but also about the
wage of the other subjects in their group.
4 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the in￿ uence of wage dispersion on workers￿e⁄orts. We
let principals in an experimental gift-exchange game choose among various wage
schemes with di⁄erent degrees of wage dispersion among four workers. We found
that principals chose most often the wage scheme with the lowest wage dispersion,
showing a preference for relatively egalitarian wage schemes. Workers reacted to
5higher wages with an increase in e⁄orts. However, workers reduced their e⁄ort,
controlling for the own wage, when the wage dispersion reached its highest level,
indicating that coworkers￿wages matter.
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